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REGULATORY POLICY-MAKING:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
PAUL A. SABATIER*

In a 1961 essay, Marver Bernstein complained that "policy-making
processes in regulatory agencies have scarcely been studied, and the
forces influencing policy-making have not been identified in specific
regulatory programs." ' Until the early 1960s, lawyers had concentrated on "judicializing" administrative procedures while economists
had dwelt on the pernicious inefficiencies of governmental regulation.' Political scientists, and some lawyers, had focused on the
relations between agencies and their constituencies and on the
consequences of different forms of governmental organization,
particularly the problems of the independent regulatory commissions.3 There were very few case studies of particular agencies, nor
many efforts to synthesize the existing literature and provide a
framework for future efforts.4
*Division of Environmental Studies, University of California, Davis.
Several people graciously took the time to offer criticisms and suggestions on earlier
drafts of this paper. The author particularly wishes to thank Mark Nadel of the Senate
Governmental Operations Committee, Daniel Mazmanian of Pomona College, Hanna Cortner of the University of Arizona, Paul Culhane of the University of Houston, and several
colleagues from U.C. Davis, including Dale Marshall, Bob Johnston, Geoffrey WandesfordeSmith, and Paul Meyer. [Editor's Note: The final draft of this manuscript was received in
November of 1976.1
1. Bernstein, The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 330 (1961).
2. See the sources cited in M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION Chs. 6-7 (1955).
3. The most notable works on agency-constituency relations were A. LEISERSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION (1942); P. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936); and Long, Power and Administration, 9 PUB. AD.
REV. 257 (1949). For the debate over the advisability of independent commissions vs. line
departments, see M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at chs. 3, 5; J.FESLER, THE INDEPENDENCE OF STATE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Pub. Ad. Publication No. 85, 1942);
R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941); Jaffe, The
Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE L.J. 1067 (1956); and J.Landis, Report
on Regulatory Agencies to the President Elect, Senate Judiciary Committee (1960). In his
1961 essay, however, Bernstein, supra note 1, at 334-35, 341-43, argued that the empirical
grounds for much of the conventional wisdom was rather weak. Brief excerpts from much
of this literature can be found in S. KRISLOV & L. MUSOLF, eds., THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION (1964).
4. P. Herring, supra note 3, has chapters on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), Federal Radio Commission, and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). R. Cushman, supra note 3, has chapters on virtually all of the
Federal commissions. For an extensive colloquy on the ICC, see Huntington, The Marasmus
of the ICC, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); Morgan, A Critique of "The Marasmus of the ICC,"
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While the decade or so since Bernstein's essay has witnessed a
continuation of previous areas of inquiry,' there have also been
numerous case studies of existing agencies. The literature is, however,
still plagued by a number of problems. First, while many of the case
studies have been relatively disinterested and theoretically informed, 6 many others have been so preoccupied with criticizing
alleged deficiencies in the agencies being examined and have been
based upon such simplistic notions of the forces affecting agency
62 YALE L.J. 171 (1953); and Huntington, The ICC Rexamined, 63 YALE L.J. 44 (1953).
For an analysis of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC), see Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1105. Finally, regulation of grazing on the public domain is discussed in P. FOSS,
POLITICS AND GRASS (1960).
For rather discursive efforts to review the previous literature, see Fainsod, Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process, PUB. POL'Y, ed. by C. Friedrich and E.
Mason 297 (1940); Redford, Perspectives for the Study of Government Regulation 6 MIDWEST J. OF POL. SCI. 1 (1962).
5. For critiques by economists, see R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS (1962); A. FRIEDLANDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION (1969); P. MACAVOY, THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
(1964); Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. OF POL. ECON. 807
(1975); and Levine, FinancialImplications of Regulatory Change in the Airline Industry, 48
S. CAL. L. REV. 645 (1976). The debate over independent commissions has been continued
in R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (1971); Bernstein, Independent Regulatory
Agencies, 400 ANNALS 14 (1972); and Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1385 (1975).
6. On the FCC, see E. KRASNOW & J. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST
REGULATION (1973) and Gehring, Comparing the Incomparable: The FCC Comparative
Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1976). On the CAB, see E.
REDFORD, THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1969) and Porter & Sagansky, Information,
Politics, and Economic Analysis, 24 PUB. POL'Y 263 (1976). On the FTC, see A. FRITSCHLER, SMOKING AND POLITICS (1969); Stone, The FTC andAdvertising Regulation,
11 PUB. POL'Y 203 (1973); Wellford, The FTC's New Look: A Case Study of Regulatory
Revival, in CONSUMER HEALTH AND PRODUCT HAZARDS 324 (S. Epstein & R.
Grundy eds. 1974); and Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47
(1969). On the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), see Brady & Althoff, The Politics of
Regulation: AEC, 1 AM. POL. Q. 361 (1973). On consumer protection agencies, see Cornell, Noll, & Weingast, Safety Regulation, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE
NEXT TEN YEARS (C. Schultz ed. 1976); D. AKER & G. DAY, CONSUMERISM (1971);
and Kelman, Regulation by the Numbers-A Report on the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 36 PUBLIC INTEREST 83 (1974). For studies of state and local pollution
control agencies, see G. HAGEVIK, DECISION-MAKING IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
(1970); E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1973);
E. SCHACTER, ENFORCING AIR POLLUTION CONTROLS: THE CASE OF NEW
YORK CITY (1974); and C. JONES, CLEAN AIR (1975). There are a number of studies of
regulatory agencies in the issue on The Government as Regulator, 400 ANNALS (1972). See
also H. CORTNER & H. INGRAM, ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION AND
ELECTRICAL ENERGY POLICY (1976); Davis & Rueter, A Simulation of Municipal
Zoning Decisions, 19 MANAGEMENT SCI. 39 (1972); and Gordon, Shipping Regulation
and the FederalMaritime Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 90 (1969). Finally, studies of
nine Federal regulatory agencies have recently been published by the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 1976).
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behavior that both the accuracy of their portraits and the utility of
their prescriptions for reform should be greeted with considerable
skepticism. 7 Secondly, most of the case studies have examined a few
decisions within a single agency. This, of course, renders the generalizability of their conclusions-both within the population of that
agency's decisions and to those of other agencies, exceedingly problemmatic. Thirdly, the efforts to synthesize the existing literature8
have generally been rather discursive in tone and have made few
efforts to: a) develop a typology of policy outputs across agencies, b)
provide a reasonably comprehensive list of variables which both
directly and indirectly affect agency policy, and c) explore the interrelationships among variables, with particular attention to the boundary conditions under which specific relationships are hypothesized.
In short, much of our existing knowledge is rather tentative, and we
are still lacking a reasonably comprehensive, empirically oriented
7. Many of them can be attributed, either directly or indirectly, to Ralph Nader; See R.
NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965); R. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR (1970); R.
FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1970); J. TURNER, THE
CHEMICAL FEAST (1970); and E. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND
(1971). Other examples of the muckraking tradition include M. MINTZ, BY PRESCRIPTION ONLY (1967) and several studies of the AEC, including S. NOVICK, THE CARELESS ATOM (1967) and R. CURTIS & E. HOGAN, PERILS OF THE PEACEFUL ATOM
(1969). Finally, NAT'L J. REP. in 1974-75 published a series of articles-many of them
quite good- on virtually all of the Federal regulatory agencies.
A good example of both the contributions and the liabilities of this literature can be
found in Esposito's study of pre-1970 Federal air pollution policy. The report was written
by a task force composed primarily of law students and headed by a recent graduate of
Harvard Law School; not a single political scientist (or economist) was included. While the
report represents the greatest single compilation of evidence on hesitant Federal efforts to
control emissions from both mobile and stationary sources, it also has a number of serious
deficiencies. First, it simply identifies the "public interest" with virtually zero emission
levels, without seriously examining the potentially adverse effects on consumer prices and
economic dislocations. Secondly, it is extremely critical of both the Congress and the
National Air Pollution Control Administration without ever acknowledging that there was
virtually no constituency support for more aggressive regulation. In short, it assumed that
public officials should be knights in shining armor irrespective of the consequences for their
organization and/or their careers. In contrast, other studies of Federal policy indicate that
both NAPCA officials and Sen. Muskie were willing to adopt an aggressive policy after they
had first made extensive efforts to mobilize a supportive constituency; see, Sabatier, Social
Movements and Regulatory Agencies, 6 POL'Y SCI. 301 (1975) and H. Ingram, The Political Rationality of Innovation (unpublished paper, U. ARIZ. (1976).
8. W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS (1969); Lazarus, Halfway Up from Liberalism, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 215 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); M. NADEL, THE
POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (1971); and Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, PUBLIC INTEREST 39 (1971). The best synthesis to date is R. Noll, Government
Administrative Behavior and Private Sector Response: A MultidisciplinarySurvey, in Handbook of Organization (W. Starbuck ed. 1977). Noll's approach, however, is basically that of
rational actor theory and (thus) he generally ignores what will be termed "situational variables."

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

framework which both synthesizes that knowledge and serves as a
guide to future studies.
This essay proposes to take the first step toward the development
of such a framework. It will first suggest a typology of regulatory
policies, with appropriate indicators as a means of both focusing
attention on this neglected area of inquiry and of facilitating comparison of agencies in different functional areas. The bulk of the
paper then discusses the principal variables affecting agency policymaking, as well as some of the more important hypotheses concerning each variable. Its distinguishing features are a detailed
examination of legal resources, an area generally slighted by political
scientists, and explicit concern with the variables indirectly affecting
agency policy, which have been ignored by most authors. Inattention
to indirect variables carries the risk that the hypothesized effects of
direct variables such as constituency groups and agency expertise on
agency decisions may, in fact, be spurious. Finally, the concluding
section will synthesize the variable list into a flow diagram to focus
attention on the manifold interrelationships among variables and the
consequent need to carefully delineate the boundary conditions
under which any posited relationship is deemed to exist.
Before beginning the substantive elaboration of such a framework,
it would be well to delimit the scope of our discussion. "Regulatory"
policy refers to that which is primarily intended and/or authorized to
regulate individual or corporate behavior rather than to provide
goods or services.' It comprises both policing and managerial policies
and agencies. Policing refers to programs in which A's behavior is
regulated to benefit B, while the managerial concept deals with cases
in which a group of functionally similar individuals or corporations
agree to collectively regulate their own behavior, generally for their
collective benefit.' 0 In either case, however, we are only concerned
with policies in which all relevant parties are pursuing goals which are
generally deemed legitimate, thereby excluding the entire criminal
justice system. In short, we shall be dealing with policies regulating
the behavior of economic producers and of people who provide
services to consumers. This framework thus applies to the traditional
federal and state regulatory agencies dealing with common carriers,
public airwaves, securities, consumer protection, and utilities; to
9. For the distinction between regulatory and distributive policies, see Sabatier, supra
note 7, at 307, and Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. AD. REV.
314 (1970).
10. For this distinction, see J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 16 (1938);
Jaffe, supra note 3; and Lazarus, supra note 8.
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pollution control agencies; to state and local agencies regulating land
development; and to licensing boards.
It is also possible that a portion of the framework, particularly the
variable list and the flow diagram, is applicable to all administrative
agencies dealing with substantive policy, whether distributive, redistributive, or regulatory. While the variables may well be the same, it
has been argued that the nature of Congressional policy-making and
the importance of constituency groups vary among different arenas
of policy. 1 I Moreover, it is quite certain that the typology of agency
outputs presented in this framework applies only to regulatory
policies. For the moment, then, the scope of the framework remains
limited to policy-making in regulatory agencies. It is hoped, however,
that it will ultimately contribute to a comprehensive theory of
policy-making in administrative agencies.
A TYPOLOGY OF POLICY OUTPUTS FOR REGULATORY AGENCIES
Systems analyses of administrative agencies commonly distinguish
1) the inputs into agency decision-making, 2) the policy outputs of
the agency, and 3) the impacts of those policies on the agency's
external environment. 1 2 In the case of an air pollution control
agency, for example, its inputs would include its statute, constituency pressure, etc.; its policies would involve its regulations and
adjudicative decisions; and its impacts would deal with the effects of
those policies on air quality, employment, etc. This section will first
discuss three different forms, or components, of policy outputs and
then aggregate them along a substantive continuum from "selfregulatory" to "aggressive" policies. The objective is, first, to promote comparisons among regulatory agencies with different functions (e.g., public utility commissions vs. pollution control
agencies)' ' and, secondly, to provide a common vocabulary for the
subsequent discussion of policy inputs. Our objective is ultimately to
indicate the effect of certain inputs, such as legal resources, on
regulatory policies, a virtually impossible task unless one has first
characterized those policies along some substantive continuum.
The policy outputs of regulatory agencies can be divided into at
least three components: A.) the general transitive goals pursued,' 4
11. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, 16
WORLD POL. 677 (1964); Lowi, supra note 9; and Sabatier, supra note 7, at 306.
12. 1. SHARKANSKY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1975); Ripley, Moreland & Sinnreich, Policy Making: A Conceptual Scheme, 1 AM. POL. Q. 3 (1973).
13. For a counter-argument doubting the feasibility of crossfunctional comparisons, see
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 336.
14. A transitive goal refers to the intended impact of the organization upon its environment, as distinguished from its reflexive goals, i.e. survival, Mohr, The Concept of Organizational Goal, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 470 (1973).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

B.) the regulations promulgated, and C.) the adjudicative decisions
made in specific cases.
A. The general goals pursued can be conceptualized as points on a
continuum ranging from minimum interference with market induced
producer behavior to an optimization of the welfare of those adversely affected by the behavior of regulated groups, such as the
consumers of unsafe products or those suffering from the effects of
pollution. These general goals can be taken from the policy statements of agency officials before legislative committees, in annual
reports, or in the introductory portions of regulations. These goals
thus represent the stated intentions of agency officials or the general
goals provided in the statute.
B. A more specific and enforceable type of policy output consists
of the regulations officially promulgated by the agency. For the
purposes of developing a substantive typology of agency policies,
there are several aspects of the regulations which merit brief discussion: (1) The initiative taken by the agency in adopting regulations.
This can range from extreme reluctance, often manifested by an
exclusive reliance on case by case adjudication, to a willingness to
adopt regulations in controversial areas entirely on its own initiative,
without prodding from its legislative, executive, or judicial sovereigns. (2) The comprehensiveness of the regulations. Do the regulations cover only those areas explicitely mandated by statute or do
they involve virtually all areas under the agency's jurisdiction? In
pollution control regulation, for example, what is the range of pollutants covered by regulation? Comprehensiveness would also involve
the agency's willingness to experiment with new techniques. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, has
attempted to supplement the traditional emission regulations with
land use controls to regulate so-called "secondary sources," e.g.,
shopping centers which encourage the use of the automobile and
thus indirectly increase automotive emissions.' 1 (3) The stringency
of the regulations. This can range from only what is acceptable to the
regulated groups through requiring what most informed people agree
is economically and technologically feasible to regulations requiring
the regulated to develop new technologies. An example of the most
stringent form of regulation would be the provision in Sec. 202 of
the 1970 Clean Air Amendments which set 1975 emission standards
at levels sufficiently low to require the development of new tech1
nologies. 6
15. U.S. E.P.A., Air Programs: Approval of Transportation and/or Land Use Controls,
308 Fed. Reg. 16,550 (1973).
16. Bonnie, The Evolution of Technology-Forcing in the Clean Air Act, 6 ENVIRONMENT REP. (Monograph No. 21, 1975).
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C. Regulations, however, must be applied to specific cases. This
final form of agency policy output generally involves at least three
aspects: (1) The granting of permits or licenses. For example, is the
application normally approved as submitted or it is frequently subjected to conditions or even denied? (2) The granting.of exceptions
or variances to the regulation. Is this done frequently and on the
basis of inadequate demonstration of hardship to the regulated or are
variances granted infrequently and with the burden of proof definitely on the petitioner? (3) The treatment of recalcitrants; the
willingness to resort to legal coercion to enforce regulations. This
ranges from endless attempts at conciliation to a ready resort to
coercion, even at the risk of extended court cases.
For analytical purposes, the goals, regulations, and adjudications
can be aggregated into several modes or ideal types of regulatory
policies. Table I presents three such modes ranged along a continuum depending upon the intended and/or authorized desire to
change A's behavior in order to benefit B. At one end is "de facto
self-regulation," in which minimal efforts are made to induce the
regulated clientele of an agency, such as industrial polluters, to
modify their behavior and incur costs in order to benefit people with
respiratory diseases who are harmed by industrial emissions. At the
other end are "aggressive" policies which seek sufficient change in
A's behavior so that B is no longer harmed. In the middle are balancing policies in which some modifications in A's behavior are sought
but in which no attempt is made to optimize B's welfare. As the
three modes are arranged along a continuum, intermediate categories,
such as "clientele-oriented balancing"' ' and "aggressive balancing,"
can also be posited.
While the three components of stated goals, regulations, and
adjudication embodied in an agency's policy need not covary in the
fashion indicated, it is my impression that they do tend to cluster
into the modes described in the table. But that, of course, is an
empirical proposition which merits investigation. At any rate, the
three modes constitute "ideal types" in the classic Weberian sense.' 8
They assume that the three components of policy will be consistent
with each other and thus offer a coherent method of characterizing
policy outputs in the aggregate. The ideal types will prove analytically useful even if the consistency assumption proves in fact to be
false, for they will have led to recognition of internal inconsistencies
17. For the purposes of this paper, "clientele" always refers to the individuals or organizations being regulated. This comprises only one of several constituencies of an agency-a
"constituency" being any group whose concern with agency policy is either latent or manifest.
18. M. WEBER, ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1949).
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in policy outputs, e.g., stringent regulations which are vitiated in
practice through the granting of extensive variances.
This conceptualization of a range of regulatory policies with
empirically verifiable indicators is clearly crucial to the development
of an analytical framework of regulatory policy-making. An adequate
theory of the factors affecting regulatory policy is obviously contingent upon the development as a means of empirically measuring
change in the dependent variable. For example, Bernstein's theory of
the cycle of decay of regulatory agencies involves the transformation
of aggressive policies into self-regulatory policies over time as the
result of the influence of those being regulated.1 9 Without a means
of substantively characterizing the policy outputs, such a statement
would be impossible. While the typology proposed here is certainly
not sacrosanct, it at least represents one of the requisites of theory
development.
Given this qualitative framework for identifying and conceptualizing the policy outputs of regulatory agencies, we must next
identify the casual factors which affect those policies.
SOURCES OF VARIATION IN REGULATORY POLICY

In this section, we shall distinguish two sets of causal factors
responsible for variation in regulatory policy. The first consists of
those attitudes and resources which operate directly on agency
policy, while the second involves variables in the agency's sociopolitical environment which can affect its policies indirectly, i.e., via
the attitudinal and resource variables. The variables outlined in Table
2 are derived from an attempt to synthesize the literatures in
administrative policy-making, organization theory, case studies of
particular agencies, and public policy. The emphasis is on comprehensiveness rather than theoretical parsimony.
A. Resource and Attitudinal Variables Directly
Affecting Agency Policy
These variables can basically be divided into two categories: the
legal and administrative resources (or constraints) of an agency and
the constraints (or resources) emanating from external factors. The
former include (1) statutory resources, (2) technical and monetary
resources, and (3) the attitudes of agency officials, while the latter
refer to the attitudes and resources of (4) its sovereigns, (5) its constituencies, and (6) other agencies.
19. BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 74; for a critique, see Sabatier, supra note 7, at 302.
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TABLE 2
VARIABLES AFFECTING POLICY-MAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES
A. Resource and Attitudinal Variables Directly Affecting Agency Policy
1. Legal Resources
a. Nature and Clarity of Policy Directives
b. Geographic and Substantive Rule-Making Authority
c. Adequacy of Sanctions
d. Administrative Structure
e. Opportunities for Citizen Participation
2. Technical, Monetary, and Personal Resources
3. Leadership Ability within Organizational Constraints
4. Agency Sovereigns
5. Constituency Groups
6. Other Agencies
B. Situational Variables Indirectly Affecting Agency Policy
1. Socio-Economic Factors
2. Political Culture
3. Technology
4. Public Opinion and the Mass Media
5. Actual Conditions and Perceived Problems

(1) Legal Resources
The first, and in many instances the most important, set of variables affecting agency policy is the statute(s), court decisions, and
executive orders which constitute its legal resources and constraints.
Because administrative officials share only indirectly in democratic
legitimacy, in any system which professes allegiance to the rule of
law they must be able to justify their actions in terms of the legal
authority conferred upon them by their legislative, executive, and
judicial sovereigns. 2" Partially for this reason, regulatory officials
often make a considerable effort to influence the legal resources
provided by their legislative and executive sovereigns. 2 1 Whatever
their origins, however, following are some of the more important
legal attributes which affect agency policy.
(a) The nature and clarity of policy directives. The policy directives contained in the declaration of intent and in more specific provisions of statutes can provide a legal justification for one mode of
regulatory policy rather than another. For example, the declared
20. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 328
(1947). A "Sovereign" refers to an institution which has the legal authority to determine an
agency's budget and/or its statutory authority. In the case of the FDA, for example, these
would include the Secretary of HEW, the Congress, the President, and the Federal courts.
The term is taken from A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 44 (1967).
21. Sapp, Executive Assistance in the Legislative Process, 6 PUB. AD. REV. 10 (1946);
White, Administrative Agencies and Statute Lawmaking, 2 PUB. AD. REV. 116 (1942); A.
FRITSCHLER, supra note 6, at 140.
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purpose of the 1963 Illinois Air Pollution Control Act was "to maintain the purity of the air resources of the State consistent with the
protection of the normal health, general welfare, and physical
property of the people, maximum employment and the full industrial development of the state." 2 2 By contrast, the 1970 Illinois
Environmental Protection Act declared that "it is the purpose of this
Act ... to restore, protect, and enhance the quality of the environ-

ment, and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment are
fully considered and borne by those who cause them." 2 3 The former
calls for the agency to balance a set of conflicting objectives, with
some bias toward economic development, while the latter clearly
accords environmental protection preeminent status. Not surpris.ingly, these statutory directives were substantially reflected in the
much more aggressive and stringent air pollution policies pursued by
Illinois officials after 1970.2 ' In the same vein, several authors have

suggested that many of the federal regulatory commissions, including
the ICC, CAB, FCC, and AEC, were directed by Congress to be
basically self-regulatory agencies; there has thus been no cycle of
decay because the agencies were intended by their legal sovereigns to
be "captured." 2
In addition to the substantive direction of the policy directives,
their clarity or specificity can have three important repercussions for
agency policy-making. First, the more ambiguous the directives, the
more the hard policy choices are displaced from the legislature to the
agency. This is likely to produce a similar transfer of constituency
pressures. As Judge Henry Friendly has observed:
Lack of definite standards creates a void into which attempts to
influence are bound to rush; legal vacuums are quite like physical

ones in that respect. Although pressure produces diffuse
decisions, it
2 6
is likewise true that diffuse decisions produce pressure.
Thus, the greater the legislatures unwillingness and/or inability to
make clear policy choices, the more important the balance of constituency support becomes in affecting agency policy. Secondly,
Roger Noll has persuasively argued that ambiguous mandates and the
absence of market performance criteria leave agency officials with
22. ILL. REV. STAT. 1968, Ch. 11112, § 5.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. 1969, Ch. 1111/2 § 2.
24. P. Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: The NAPCA-EPA Citizen
Participation Program (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. Chi. 1974).
25. Jaffe, supra note 4; Jaffe, supra note 3; E. KRASNOW & J. LONGLEY, supra note 6;
J.LANDIS, supra note 10; and Stone, supra note 6.
26. H. FRIENDLEY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 22 (1962). See
also Long, supra note 3; Brady & Althoff, supra note 6, at 361, 379 (1973).
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few positive guidelines as to whether they are acting in the public
interest and thus make them very attentive to cues from their legislative sovereigns and the courts. 2 As these cues are in turn dependent
upon the ability of various constituency groups to muster the resources to bring suits and to influence legislators, the importance of
organized constituencies is further enhanced. If, as is usually the
case, producer groups are much better organized than their consumer
or environmental counterparts, agency policy makers will have strong
incentives to similarly skew their policy outputs; to do otherwise
would be to risk retribution at the hands of sovereigns sympathetic
to producer preferences.2 8 Finally, a vague mandate can imperil the
legitimacy of an agency's decisions by creating conflict over its
proper goals and by eliminating justification of its policies in terms
of clear decisions previously made by democratically-accountable
legislatures. 2
In short, ambiguous mandates contribute to both
"clientele capture" and to the current crisis in confidence in public
bureaucracies.
(b) The geographic and substantive rule-making authority accorded the agency. The scope of an agency's authority involves a
number of different aspects. First, is the matter of whether it has
rule making authority at all or must instead proceed entirely on a
case by case basis. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, did
not initiate any rule making proceedings until 1962, 48 years after its
establishment, in part because of doubts concerning its legal authority to do so. 3 0 The substantive scope of an agency's authority is also
obviously important. The FTC, for example, did not have authority
over deceptive advertising practices until 1938.' ' Then there is the
geographic scope of an agency's authority. State and local air and
water pollution control agencies, for example, have been hampered
27. Noll, supra note 8, at 37.
28. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); M. NADEL, supra
note 8, at 235; Sabtier, supra note 7, at 307. In their study of the FTC, for example, E.
KRASNOW & V. LONGLEY (supra note 6, at 16) attribute much of the agency's historic
deference to commercial broadcasters to the vague Congressional mandate to regulate the
public airwaves in "the public convenience and necessity." For similar argument with respect to the FTC, see P. HERRING, supra note 3, at 111.
29. T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). This was illustrated by the difficulties of the Grazing Service in administering the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. The Act's
vague provision for "reasonable fees" led to considerable antagonism toward the service on
the part of both stockmen, who argued that fees should be based entirely upon administrative costs and who resented the expanding bureaucracy they were being asked to support,
and economy-minded Congressmen and conservationists, who felt fees should be based upon
the value of the land leased for grazing. The result was a 50% reduction in the Service's
appropriation for FY 1946 and its incorporation soon thereafter into the Bureau of Land
Management. See P. FOSS, supra note 4, at 171.
30. A. FRITSCHLER, supra note 6, at 56.
31. Id. at 63.

July 19771

REGULA TORY POLICY-MAKING

by their inability to control sources outside their jurisdiction. This
has impeded effective regulation because of pollutant transport and,
more importantly, because officials fear that stringent policies will
gradually result in the loss of tax dollars and employment opportunities to more lenient jurisdictions. It is in part because of limitations in the geographic authority of state and local institutions, both
to control externalities and to promote coordination, that there has
been a substantial transfer of authority in the area to regional or
Federal agencies.' 2
In general, limitations on an agency's authority render aggressive
regulation more difficult if not impossible. The exception occurs in
instances in which an agency is given such sweeping authority that
meaningful guidelines become more difficult to determine. An
example often cited is the effect of the Transportation Act of 1920
and the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 on the ICC. Whereas the agency
was originally given the rather limited and precise role of protecting
shippers from the monopolistic practices of the railroads, the expansion of its authority to virtually all modes of surface transportation
transformed it from a policer of specific abuses to a manager preoccupied with the economic welfare of a crucial segment of the
economy. 3 In this respect, Lazarus has argued quite persuasively
that managerial agencies are potentially far more detrimental to consumers than are those with policing functions. The latter, if "captured," are unlikely to produce more social harm than if they had
never been created. Managerial agencies, however, because of their
exclusive control over price and entry, can give producers more
power than they possessed prior to the agency's establishment.3
(c) The adequacy and application of sanctions. Regulations, if
they are to affect behavior, must be enforced. While any agency has
to rely primarily upon voluntary compliance, the absence of effective
legal sanctions is likely to make an aggressive regulatory policy all
but impossible. For such a policy, by definition, seeks to substantially modify the behavior of the regulated, often at substantial cost
to them. Such changes are likely to be effectively resisted unless the
agency can produce sufficient disincentives to convince the regulated
that the costs of noncompliance outweigh those of resistance.
Experience, albeit somewhat impressionistic, suggests that the
32. M. DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION (1974); Grad, Rathgens &
Rosenthal, Intergovernmental Aspects of Environmental Controls, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL: PRIORITIES, POLICIES, AND LAW 47 (1971); and Sabatier, State and Local
EnvironmentalPolicy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 160 (S. Nagel ed. 1974).
33. T. LOWI, supra note 3, at 130; P. WOLL, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 40 (1963).
34. Lazarus, supra note 8, at 232.
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effectiveness of sanctions is contingent upon at least three factors.
First, the agency should have the authority to impose sanctions for
future, as well as past, misconduct. That is, performance bonds as
well as fines. Fines as a sanction suffer the disadvantage of forcing
the agency to engage in prolonged litigation which, if not accompanied by an injunction, allows the alleged violation to continue
during the legal proceedings.3 Secondly, the agency should have at
its disposal a wide range of sanctions conforming to the severity of
the violation. One of the major problems in enforcing the automotive
emission standards of the 1970 Clean Air Act, for example, has been
the absence of any sanctions short of the "nuclear deterrent" of
closing the auto companies. 3 6 On the whole, however, the problem
has been that the money penalties available to regulatory agencies
have been insufficient to deter large corporations from malfeasance. 3 ' Finally, the effectiveness of the sanctions probably depends
upon the speed, certainty, and directness with which they are
applied. Most regulatory agencies must rely upon the uncertain and
often time consuming intermediary of the courts to impose civil
penalties. In contrast, the experience of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, which has the authority to impose penalties subject only to
review by the appellate courts, suggests that there is a much more
effective means of legal coercion. The exercise of such authority does
require that the agency, in order to assure due process, have rather
formalized adjudicatory proceedings and possibly that it be headed
by a multi-member commission.
(d) Administrative structure. This variable incorporates the
organizational structure and procedures of the agency which are
mandated by its sovereign through its organic statute, budgetary
stipulations, executive orders, or court decisions on due process.
Important structural aspects include the visibility of the agency, its
independence from executive control, its placement within the
administrative hierarchy, the composition of its policy board, and
the degree of formal centralization.
The visibility of an agency, its ability to resist being buried in large
line departments, probably affects the amount of media coverage.
35. The experience of the Illinois Pollution Control Board suggests the conditioning of
installation and operating permits upon the posting of performance bonds of as much as
several million dollars represents a very effective disincentive against procrastination. Such
performance bonds are also often required by the Forest Service on timber permits and by
local planning commissions of subdivision conditions.
36. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, THE IMPACT OF
AUTO EMISSION STANDARDS: A STAFF REPORT, Doc. No. 11, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. vii
(1973).
37. P. HERRING, supra note 3, at 226; Stone, supra note 6, at 222.
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Exposure, in turn, facilitates both monitoring by groups without
extensive resources and the agency's own ability to mobilize diffuse
public support.
Despite the long standing dispute in the field of public administration concerning the advisability of independent commissions versus
line departments, there is little evidence that this aspect of organiza3
tional structure has significant policy implications. 8 As indicated
above, however, the courts are unlikely to permit an agency headed
by a single official responsible only to the chief executive to levy
money penalties; this is one of the major advantages of a multimembered commission with staggered terms. On the other hand,
Lazarus has argued that line departments responsible to a political
executive will perhaps be more responsive, at least momentarily, to

consumer reform movements. 3 9
The location of an agency within the administrative structure is
potentially important because it affects the nature of the agency's
executive sovereigns. Environmental groups, for example, have long
supported the transfer of the Forest Service from the Department of
Agriculture to the Department of the Interior because of the alleged
bias of the former to commercial production rather than to preservation or recreation. It is my impression, however, that the empirical
evidence underlying such reorganization proposals is rather weak, in
part because the heads of megadepartments often have only very
limited capacity to review the decisions of regulatory sub-units.4 0
The composition of the policy-making board, if there is one, can
obviously have an important effect on agency policy. If, as was the
case with many of the early state air and water pollution control
agencies, the enabling statute provides extensive formal representation fror regulated interests, then an aggressive policy is extremely
unlikely. This has been confirmed by Wenner's study of state water
38. R. NOLL, supra note 5; Cornell, Noll & Weingast, supra note 6.
39. Lazarus, supra note 8, at 224.
40. In private correspondence Paul Culhave has argued that changing the departmental
sovereign of the Forest Service would probably be counterproductive for two reasons. First,
the Department of Interior has not had a notably "preservationist" track record with
respect to grazing (BLM), water resource projects (Reclamation), or offshore oil regulation.
Secondly, the almost complete lack of congruence between agriculture's dominant clientele
and the Forest Service's forest products industry clientele has had the effect-along some
other things like professionalism-of making the Service virtually an independent bureau
within USDA. There is also evidence that the Food and Drug Administration is highly
independent of the Secretary of HEW, as the latter virtually never reviews its decisions.
[SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HEARINGS ON IMPROVING
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55
(1976)1. For discussion of reorganizations, see F. MOSHER, GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATIONS (1967), and Mansfield, Reorganizing the Federal Executive Branch, 35 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 461-(1970).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

pollution control agencies, at least with respect to the stringency of
4
regulations. '
The degree of legally mandated centralization within an agency
can also have policy implications. A decentralized agency normally
permits considerably more inter-regional policy variation than does a
centralized one. Moreover, there is some evidence, although by no
means overwhelming, that decentralized federal agencies are generally more responsive to producer interests because of the greater
influence of producers at the state level than at the federal level. 4 2
(e) The last legal attribute to be discussed involves the opportunities provided by an agency's statute for citizen participation.

This is important because it regulates the participation of "outsiders," actors who are neither agency officials nor the parties directly being regulated, but who nevertheless may be interested in, or
affected by, the agency's decisions. As Joseph Sax has observed,

provision for citizen participation is at least implicitly based upon the
assumption that "the public interest" is more likely to emerge from

adversary proceedings than from faith that agency officials are really

Platonic philosopher-kings.4 3 Indeed, one of the major changes in
regulatory policy-making during the I 960s and early I 970s involved
more liberal provisions for the participation of third parties both in
agency decisions and in the appeals of those decisions to the courts.
This trend has been reversed somewhat by recent restrictions on class
action suits.4"
41. L. Wenner, Enforcement of Water Pollution Control Laws (Paper presented at the
1972 Ann. Meeting Am. Pol. Sci. A., Wash., D.C., Sept. 1972).
42. P. FOSS, supra note 4; G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1966); and H. MARSHALL & B. ZISK, THE FEDERAL-STATE STRUGGLE FOR OFFSHORE OIL (Inter-University Case Program No. 98, 1966).
43. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971). As Chief Justice Warren Burger, then sitting on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, argued in the case of
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966):
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation of
legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general
is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they
are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is
no longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual
experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it.
This assumes, on the other hand, that the truth and/or the public interest is most likely to
emerge from a system in which competing interests are able to state their case. See Shor,
Administration of the Under-Represented (Paper Presented at the 1972 Ann. Meeting Am.
Pol. Sci. A., Wash. D.C., 1972); Auerbach, Pluralism and the Administrative Process 400
ANNALS 1 (1972); and George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,
66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1972).
44. Leone, Public Interest Advocacy and the Regulatory Process 400 ANNALS 46
(1972); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. REV. 450 (1970); and Orren,
Standing to Sue 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 723 (1976).
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As Sax has argued quite persuasively, it makes a great deal of
difference whether the citizen participates as a suppliant or as a
formal party with legal rights. One of the traditional avenues for such
participation in agency policy-making has been the public hearing.

There is a world of difference between the advisory hearing, where
agency officials are free to ignore the advice proferred, and more
formal hearings, where third parties are granted status as formal
interveners, possibly having the authority to veto arguments between the agency and the regulated party.4 ' Therefore, the form of
the advisory hearing will determine, in part, the effectiveness of
public participation.
In general, however, citizens achieve their most formal legal status
in appeals of agency decisions to the courts. In addition to more
liberal judicial interpretations of standing in the past fifteen years,

many regulatory statutes now contain explicit provisions for citizen
suits. One such statute is the 1970 Michigan Environmental Protection Act, which grants standing to virtually anyone to challenge
almost any agency decision. Examples are the most recent Federal air
and water pollution control statutes, which in effect grant citizens
the right to bring mandamus actions, requiring agency officials to
comply with non-discretionary statutory requirements. 4 6
What is implied, in short, is that the probability of the "capture" of
regulatory agencies by their regulated clientele is inversely propor-

tional to the formal provision for third party participation, particularly in court suits. For, while the consumer reform movement may
well wane, its interests may be partially protected by public interest
law firms and even by individual plaintiffs. It is important, however,
that citizen participation provisions be mandated by statute rather
than left to the discretion of agency officials, as there is some evi45. The distinction between "formal" and "advisory" hearings is taken from Reich, The
Law of the Planned Society 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1969). For discussions of these and other
means of participation, e.g. advisory boards, see (in addition to Reich) W. BOYER, BUREAUCRACY ON TRIAL 68 (1964) and A. LEISERSON, supra note 3, at 54. The importance of formal status was vividly demonstrated in several cases involving a local air pollution group and the Chicago Environmental Appeals Board in which the group actually
vetoed agreements between the Department of Environmental Control and local industries,
thereby forcing the parties to negotiate more stringent control measures (Sabatier, supra
note 7, at 322).
46. For the text and rationale of the Michigan statute, see J. SAX, supra note 43. For
some excellent data on its implementation, see Sax & Conner, Michigan Environmental
Protection Act: A Progress Report 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003 (1972) and Sax & Dimento,
Environmental Citizen Suits 4 ECOL. L.Q. 1 (1974). Other citizen suit provisions are
contained in Sec. 304 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 Pub. L. No. 91-604 and Sec.
505 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 Pub. L. No. 92-500.
An example of the successful invocation of the citizen suit provisions occurred when a
public interest law firm forced the EPA to promulgate rather draconian regulations sufficient to attain the oxidant ambient air standards in the Los Angeles Basin.
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dence that officals will ignore participation programs
which do not
the agency's programs. 4 7

result in increased support for
These aspects of an agency's legal resources are tentatively summarized and aggregated in Table 3. Each of the component resources
of an agency are rated on a 5-point ordinal scale, with the highest
ratings presumably indicating those resources most conducive to
pursuit of an aggressive regulatory policy. These separate scales can
then be aggregated into a "legal resources" rating suitable for use in

quantitative multi-variate analysis.
This completes our discussion of the statutory and other legal
resources which affect agency policy. It has been rather detailed,
first, to illustrate the type of analysis which is necessary and, second,
to counteract the neglect of such variables among many contem-

porary political scientists.4 8 We must now turn, albeit in briefer

fashion, to the other factors which directly affect the policy outputs
of regulatory agencies.

(2) Technical, monetary, and personnel resources
Most of a regulatory agency's monetary and personnel resources
are used in the development of its technical expertise, in part because

its technical superiority over legislative bodies is its primary raison
d'etre, in part because it lacks of democratic legitimacy, particularly

in cases of ambiguous legislative directives, means that it must rely
upon its expertise for much of its legitimacy. 4 9
47. Mazmanian, ParticipatoryDemocracy in a FederalAgency, in WATER POLLUTION
AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 201 (J. Pierce & H. Doerksen ed. 1976).
48. Much of the responsibility for the neglect of legal variables can probably be traced to
Lindblom's emphasis on "incremental bargaining" and "partisan mutual adjustment" (C.
LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (1968), as well as his earlier writings]. For
studies of bureaucratic policy-making within this tradition, see M. HOLDEN, POLLUTION
CONTROLS AS A BARGAINING PROCESS (1966) and F. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY,
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1969). This paradigm of "interest group liberalism" has
been strongly criticized, see T. Lowi, supra note 29.
49. F. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (2d ed.,
1976); WOLL, supra note 33, at 31; and Kelman, supra note 6, at 91. To give a rough idea
of the proportion of funds and personnel budgeted to essentially technical-rather than
management-tasks, following are the budget and personnel breakdown for the Environmental Protection Agency in FY 1974:
End of Year
Budget
Employment
Research and Development
Abatement and Control
Enforcement
Management
Miscellaneous
Total

$168,916,0008
256,093,900 89%
46,781,000)
55,073,111
2,015,00
$528,879,011

1,902k
3,671 77%
1,557)
1,859
214
9,203

Excluded are the $4,000,000,000 in construction grants administered by the agency. Un-
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The technical resources available to an agency can substantially
affect the stringency of its regulations and the feasibility of various
enforcement strategies. Because the regulation of business so often
involves the use and/or assessment of new technologies, the feasibility of stack gas desulfurization in air pollution control and the safety
of emergency core cooling systems of nuclear power plants being two
examples, the agency's capacity to develop expertise sufficient to
prove its case in the face of counter claims by the regulated industry
and other groups will often be an important factor in determining
the stringency of its regulations.' 0 Similarly, aggressive enforcement
and a resort to legal coercion are contingent upon a credible threat to
successfully prosecute violators. This in turn requires a staff of sufficient size to systematically monitor compliance and of sufficient
expertise to be able to prove its case in court. The absence of such a
staff has certainly been one of the principal reasons why most state
and local pollution control agencies have been virtually forced to rely
upon voluntary compliance-on conference and conciliation -rather
than risk the devastating effects of losing a court case, thereby
throwing their entire programs into question.'5
For these reasons, one of the most serious problems confronting
many regulatory agencies has been the control over vital technical
information exercised by the regulated interests. The result has been
that many agencies, including the FCC, the agencies in the Interior
Department regulating oil companies, and insurance commissions,
have been obliged to either hire people temporarily from the regulated industry and/or to submit their proposed regulations to technical advisory panels composed largely of industry personnel.
Although private employees in their public roles may well take a
broader review of the public good than before, such arrangements
have seldom resulted in policies strongly opposed by the regulated
parties. 5 2 University faculties would supposedly comprise an alternafortunately, figures were not presented on the proportion of personnel within the essentially
technical functional areas who were non-technical, e.g. clerical. Source: Hearings on
Agricultural-Environmentand Consumer Protection AppropriationsBefore Senate Appropriations Committee 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1387 (1974).
50. For the debate over stack gas desulfurization, see de Nevers, Enforcing the Clean Air
Act of 1970, 228 SCI. AM. 14 (1973); Enghahl, A Critical Review of Regulations for the
Control of Sulfur Oxide Emissions, 23. J. AIR POLLUTION CONT. A. 364 (1973); and
Hearingson Coal Policy Issues Before Senate Committee on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1973).
51. Sabatier, supra note 24, at ch. 8; NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., WASTE MANAGEMENT
AND CONTROL 203 (1966); and R. SCHACHTER, supra note 6.
52. W. BOYER, supra note 45, at 59; R. ENGLER, THE POLITICS OF OIL (1960), Chs.
10-12; BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at Ch. 4; FESSLER, supra note 3, at 70; J. Steck, Power
and the Policy Process: Advisory Committees in the Federal Government (Paper presented
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tive source of expertise. However, while there have been some
notable exceptions such as Herbert Denenberg, formerly the Pennsylvania insurance commissioner, the academic reward structure and
the lucrative consulting contracts available from regulated industries
have generally limited the availability of academics to staff stringent
regulatory programs for any extended period of time.' 3
A related problem has been that even those agencies with competent staff free from conflicts of interest have often had to rely
upon information furnished by the industry because only the industry has had the funds and/or legal authority to conduct the
necessary research. The fruits of the research naturally become
proprietary information, jealously guarded from competitors and
supervising agencies alike. An often cited example involves the control of the oil industry over both geologic and production data. 4
Without such supporting technical information, stringent regulation
of the industry is difficult to justify; thus, there is a strong tendency
toward cautious regulatory policies which do not offend the regulated interests.
While monetary and personnel resources are important primarily
for their impact on the agency's capacity to acquire expertise independent of regulated interests, there are a couple of other points
worth mentioning. First, insofar as the civil service system impedes
the replacement of mediocre personnel, it impairs an agency's efficiency and thus its capacity to implement aggressive policies. Second,
there is an accumulating body of evidence indicating that the
presence of slack resources is one of the most important variables
affecting an agency's capacity to respond to a changing political
environment.' I Such unencumbered resources can, for example,
affect an agency's capacity to respond to an upsurge in support for
at the 1972 Ann. Meeting Am. Pol. Sci. A., Washington, D.C., Sept. 1972); but see Kelman,
supra note 6, at 86, 102.
53. Deneberg, formerly a professor of business at the University of Pennsylvania, has
been portrayed as an unusually aggressive regulator of the insurance industry, Hearings on
Independent Consumer ProtectionAgency, Before Senate Commerce Committee, 93d Cong.
1st sess. 15 (1973). For the problems of finding university faculty to testify in environmental cases, see S. EBBEN & R. KASPER, CITIZENS GROUPS AND THE NUCLEAR
POWER CONTROVERSY 178 (1974). Moreover, when the Illinois Pollution Control Board
was being staffed in 1970, a number of prominent academics from Chicago refused to be
considered for appointment because of the full-time nature of the job. And even the one
who accepted the chairmanship, David Currie, returned to his position as a law professor
after less than two years. (Sabatier, supra note 24, at Chs. 5-6).
54. Hearings on Energy Information Act, Before Senate Interior Committee, 93d Cong.,
2d sess. (1974); also E. HERRING, supra note 3, at 179.
55. H. KAUFMAN, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 23 (1971); H.
CORTNER & H. INGRAM, supra note 6, at 76; and J. Nienabler, H. Ingram, D. McCool,
The Rich Get Richer Phenonmenon (Paper presented at the 1976 Ann. Meeting Midwest
Pol. Sci. A., Chicago, April 1976).
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consumer and/or environmental protection by initiating more aggressive policies, such as more court actions, new regulations, and requests for additional statutory authority.
(3) Personal preferences and leadership ability within
organizational constraints
Herbert Simon and a number of other organization theorists have
argued that decision making in virtually any organization gradually
evolves until it is characterized by what he terms "bounded rationality" that is: by developing specialized sub-units, by choosing a
course of action which is "good enough" rather than optimal, by
emphasizing short run feedback rather than long term planning, and
by the development of standardized search procedures and programs
for dealing with recurring situations.' 6 In addition, the desire of
outsiders to control agency misbehavior and of hierarchial inferiors
to control their subordinates result in still more internal rules and
regulations and the consequent departure of innovative, free wheeling individuals.' " In turn, this panoply of programmed behavior, the
need for negotiation among specialized sub-units, the emphasis on
short term, sub-optimal goals, and the gradual accumulation of
officials comfortable with such a constrained environment and with a
general policy orientation tend to discourage innovative, high risk
policies, thereby furnishing another clue to the paucity of aggressive
regulatory programs.' I
Notwithstanding the constraints placed on agency officials by law,
by technical resources, and by the nature of organizational decisionmaking, there is a realm of discretion in which the officials' personal
preferences and leadership ability are important. At the most
aggregate level, this involves the choice of institutional mission and
role. As indicated by Selznick, "the leader must specify and recast
the general aims of his organization so as to adapt them without
serious corruption, to the requirements of institutional survival."" 9
56. J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958). For an excellent summary of
this literature, see G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION Ch. 3 (1971).
57. See, for example, A. DOWNS, supra note 20, at Ch. 12-13; H. KAUFMAN, supra
note 55, at 31.
58. There are, however, a number of internal factors which affect the agency's willingness to be innovative and to take risks. These include (i) the age of the agency, (ii) the age
distribution, turnover rate, recruitment patterns, and promotion patterns of itsemployees,
(iii) the degree of hierarchial control of subunit decisions and processes, (iv) the openness of
communication channels, both within the agency and to the external world, and as noted
previously (v) the pressure of slack resources. See H. KAUFMAN, supra note 55, at ch. 2; A.
DOWNS, supra note 20 at Chs. 9-10; and Ripley, Moreland & Sinnreich, supra note 12, at
10.
59. P. SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 66 (1957). See also H. Wolman, Organization Theory and Community Action Agencies, 32 PUB. AD. REV. 33 (1972).
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This involves, among other things, the choice of strategies for implementing the chosen perceived goals and the search for a role
among the organizations which carry on related activities. 6 0 Decisions on these very basic matters, as well as on more routine substantive policy decisions, will be affected by several factors, among
the most important of which are the official's policy predisposition
(e.g. on a self-regulatory/aggressive scale) and his basic role orientation.
The normative preferences of agency officials on a self-regulatory/
aggressive scale obviously affect their discretionary decisions. An
excellent example was provided in Illinois after the passage of the
Environmental Protection Act of 1970. The long time administrator
of state air and water pollution control programs, Clarence Klassen,
viewed the statute and the new policy board as threats to the very
cautious policies he had been pursuing rather than as resources to
allow pursuit of more aggressive policies. After six months of obstruction and bitter wrangling, he was asked to6 retire, to be replaced
by someone more attuned to the new mandate. 1
TABLE 4
ROLE ORIENTATIONS OF REGULATORY OFFICIALS

Passive

Active

Trusteea

Delegatea

Legal-rationalistb

Quietly acts on his/her
conception of public
goods, perhaps derived
from professional
norms

Receptive to preferences
of one or more
constituencies

Views oneself as simply
an administrator of
statutes and other
legal rules

Solicits support for
such a conception

Solicits constituency
preferences

Seeks guidance from
sovereigns when
uncertain

a. The term "trustee" and "delegate" are borrowed from the literature on legislative role
orientations and have been applied to administrative officials by Friedman and his colleagues [J. WAHLKE et al., THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM (1962); R. Friedman et al.,
"Administrative Agencies and the Public they Service," 26 PUB. ADM. REV. 192 (1966)].
b. The "legal-rationalist" conception is taken, hopefully without unwarranted confusion,
from Weber's conception of the bureaucrat [THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 329 (1947)].
c. For a review of the effect of professional norms on policy predispositions see R.
FRIEDMAN, PROFESSIONALISM: EXPERTISE AND POLICY MAKING (1971) and P.
MOYNIHAM, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (1970), Chapt. 2.
60. P. SELZNICK, supra note 59, at 82; A. McFARLAND, POWER AND LEADERSHIP
IN PLURALIST SYSTEMS Ch. 8-9 (1969); and D. KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 01 ORGANIZATIONS Ch. 11 (1966).
6 1. Sabatier, supra note 24, at Ch. 6. For another example, see P. HERRING, supra note
3, at 147.
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In addition to an official's basic preferences about how aggressive
a policy the agency should pursue, the origin of those preferences is
obviously important because it indicates which reference groups are
likely to have an impact on the official's policy predisposition. The
columns in Table 4 indicate three potential reference groups for
seeking guidance within the realm of discretion and the accompanying role orientation: 1) one's conscience or the norms of one's
profession ("trustee"), 2) one or more constituency groups ("delegate"), and/or 3) the legal sovereigns ("legal-rationalist"). For
example, an official could pursue a self-regulatory policy either out
of deference to perceived legislative intent (legal-rationalist) or
because he felt that the interests of regulated parties ought to be
safeguarded (delegate from regulated); attempts to change his attitudes would obviously involve quite different strategies in the two
cases, with the latter being far more resistant to change.
The rows in Table 4 simply indicate that an official's orientation
toward these reference groups can vary from passively noting their
expressed preferences to actively soliciting their input. The degree of
activism is particularly important for delegates, who can range from
passive receptacles of interest group pressures through solicitors of
group preferences to those who actually go out and organize latent
constituency groups.6

2

The most extreme form of activism, while

rare, can make an enormous difference in regulatory programs, as
consumer and/or environmental interests are normally very diffuse
and poorly organized, and thus their interests will often go unarticulated unless agency officials make a concerted effort to solicit them.
Unfortunately, very little is known about the factors which affect
either an official's choice of reference groups or his degree of activism in soliciting their preferences. At times, of course, the reference
group is more or less stipulated by statute, as when specific members
of air pollution control boards were designated as the representatives
of labor, farmers, or industry. There has also been a fair amount of
theorizing and/or speculation concerning the impact of officials'
career patterns on their behavior while with the agency. It has been
argued, for example, that officials who come from the regulated
industry and/or leave the agency to seek employment with the industry or a corporate law firm will view themselves as delegates from
that interest and/or pursue essentially self-regulatory policies to
62. For example, the National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) organized
air pollution groups in local communities throughout the country in 1969-72 (Sabatier,
supra note 7, at 310). The possible strategy of mobilizing support from latent groups has
been ignored by virtually all students of regulatory agencies with the exception for Fainsod,
supra note 4, at 320 and ROURKE, supra note 48, at 14.
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enhance their employment potential.6 But there has yet been no
studies indicating that officials with this career pattern vote differently from academics or former legislators.
As well as differing in their policy and role orientations, individual
agency officials can vary tremendously in their leadership ability, i.e.
their ability to maintain a balance of political support, to implement
difficult or unpopular programs, to maintain agency morale, etc. In
addition, the abilities of the same person can produce markedly
different results in different situations, as illustrated by Sargent
Shriver's contrasting performances
in the Peace Corps and in the
64
Office of Economic Opportunity.
(4) The attitudes and resources of agency sovereigns
Another rather obvious set of factors affecting agency policy is the
attitudes and resources of the agency's sovereigns; those officials (or
institutions) who control the agency's legal and/or budgetary resources. For a local pollution control agency these include the
mayor, the city council, the courts, the state pollution control
agency (and indirectly probably the governor and legislature), and
the Federal EPA. The sovereigns of the EPA in turn include the
Congress, the President, and the Federal courts.
Influence by the sovereigns over agency policy is both prospective,
in the form of authorizing statutes and budgetary appropriations,
and retrospective, in the form of investigations, audits, and vetoes of
particular actions.
Because of multiple sovereigns and generally weak party systems,
regulatory agencies in the U.S. are seldom, if ever, "controlled" by
any single sovereign. Instead, they generally "stand in a feudal relation in which to a degree they fend for themselves and acquire
support peculiarly their own." ' 6 1 In addition, the very multitude and
technical nature of regulatory actions pose a significant barrier to
comprehensive review by the sovereigns, all of which have staffs
much smaller than the agencies themselves. As a result, review is
generally limited to broad policy decisions and to a few specific
actions which happen, for one reason or another, to be brought to
the attention of one or more sovereigns. But this is not to deny that
the sovereigns have considerable means to influence agency policy
nor that collectively they represent probably the most important
direct influence.
63. For an excellent discussion, see Noll, supra note 8. For data on career patterns in two
agencies, see H. CORTNER & H. INGRAM, supra note 6, at 22, and Posner, supra note 6, at
84.
64. ROURKE, supra note 48, at 76.
65. Long, supra note 3, at 257-58.
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The mechanisms available to chief executives include the appointment of top agency officials, review of the agency's proposed budget,

control of its legislative program, the promulgation of executive
orders, and, in some cases, review of proposed regulations.6 6 These
supposedly have less effect on independent agencies like the ICC
than on line departments such as the FDA, although this is by no
means certain. 6 7 For example, the independent California Public
Utilities Commission approved utility rate increases of $1,157 million in 1968-73 when a conservative Republican was Governor, in
contrast to a $33 million decrease during the 1962-66 period of his
liberal Democratic predecessor. While other factors were probably
operating, this is at least prima facie evidence of the effects of
gubernatorial preferences on a supposedly independent commission. 6 s
The mechanisms available to legislative sovereigns, particularly to

the relevant policy committees and appropriation subcommittees,
include control over the agency's statutory authority and budget,
confirmation of some officials, investigation, audit by the General
Accounting Office, oversight hearings, and, in some instances, vetoes
of specific regulations. 6 9 Harris has concluded that legislative "control" tends to be more through authorizing legislation than through
oversight. 7 0 There are, however, several examples of successful
Congressional efforts to convince a regulatory agency to rescind or
modify proposed regulations. These include the FTC's proposed ban
on cigarette advertising and EPA's proposed regulations concerning
66. ROURKE, supra note 48, at 31. The capacity of the President to influence the
bureaucracy increased considerably with the formation of the Bureau of the Budget in
1921. Its successor, the Office of Management and Budget, has not hesitated to take an
active role in reviewing proposed regulations. This was illustrated in its revisions of the
guidelines for air pollution implementation plans originally proposed by EPA; Miller, Air
Pollution, in NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (J. Rothlesberger ed. 1972). See also,
E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 6, at 44 and L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS Ch. 4 (1969).
67. Probably the most important mechanism for "assuring" the independence of regulatory commissions from executive control is the staggered terms of commissioners. But this
has certainly not prevented rather dramatic reversals in policy via a few new appointments;
for examples on the FPC and FCC, respectively, see P. HERRING, supra note 3, at 122, and
E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 6, at 107. For more general discussions, see W.
CARY, supra note 8, and R. NOLL, supra note 5, at 45.
68. California Planning and Conservation League, The Power Behind the Power 2 CAL.
TODAY 1 (1974).
69. J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1964); E.
KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 6, at Ch. 3; Scher, Congressional Committee
Members as Independent Agency Overseers, 54 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 911 (1960);Hearings on Improving Congressional Oversight of FederalRegulatory Agencies, Before Senate
Government Operations Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); and A. WILDAVASKY,
THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (2d ed. 1974).
70. J. HARRIS, supra note 69, at 310, 318.
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the construction of parking facilities."1 Oversight is often a neglected function, in part because of the multiple demands on a legislator's time, in part because of its perceived marginal effect on the
legislator's career. Exceptions include agencies important in obtaining reelection such as the FCC, those which, for one reason or anattention, or those which are salient to imother, command media
7
portant constituents. 2
Court review of agency decisions is generally limited to cases in
which the agency has either expressly violated a statute or has acted
arbitrarily and capriciously.' 3 Limitations concerning both the scope
of review and the standing of potential litigants can, however, be

considerably modified by statute.
Finally, local and/or state agencies may be influenced by their

intergovernmental superiors, either through conditions attached to
grants-in-aid or through formal review granted by statute. While these

mechanisms have generally been more effective in convincing subordinate units to establish programs than in influencing their content, the potential is certainly there. Recent Federal air and water

pollution control acts, for example, give the EPA authority to directly administer permit programs, and thus to effectively supplant
the local and state agencies, if it is dissatisfied with their programs." 4
Through such mechanisms the sovereigns, both individually and
collectively, constitute a major factor directly influencing agency
policy. In addition, they represent access points to which constituency groups and others interested in the agency can appeal when

dissatisfied. It is to these actors that we must now turn.
71. A. FRITSCHLER, supra note 6, at Ch. 7;EPA Stretches Air Pollution Law to Avoid
Ordering Traffic Controls, Nat'l. J. 915 (1972). In addition there appears to be a great deal
of informal oversight by committee chairmen, but this is very difficult to monitor, A.
WILDAVSKY, supra note 69, at 74.
72. The House Ways and Means Committee, for example, has not conducted oversight
hearings on either the U.S. tax code or on the Social Security Administration for over 20
years. The exceptions include the FCC's license renewal hearings, E. KRASNOW & L.
LONGLEY, supra note 6, at Ch. 8; the FDA, which is closely covered by Morton Mintz of
The Washington Post; and CAB, which is in some respects a "pork barrel" regulatory
agency, E. REDFORD, supra note 6, at Ch. 3. For an excellent overview of oversight, see M.
OGULS, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976).
73. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, Chs. 14-15
(1965); J. SAX, supra note 43, at 125; and White, Allocating Power Between Agencies and
Courts, DUKE L.J. 195 (1974).
74. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 113, and Water Pollution Control Amendments,
of 1972, Title IV. On the whole, however, Federal regulatory agencies have probably had
rather little influence over their state and local counterparts. For many of the reasons, see
H. KAUFMAN, POLITICS AND POLICIES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
Ch. 1 (1963); H. Ingram, Impacts of EnvironmentalPolicy: An Evaluation of FederalGrants
in Aid (Paper presented at the 1974 Ann. Meeting Western Pol. Sci. A., Denver, 1974); and
M. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM (1972).
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(5) Constituency groups
The constituencies of an agency are those private actors who,
either actually or potentially, seek to influence its policies, generally
because they perceive themselves to be affected by them. It is useful
to distinguish between a) organized interest groups, b) unorganized
individuals who nevertheless take an interest in the agency and
occasionally attempt to influence its policies, and c) individuals who
do not realize that they are affected by an agency's policies.7" The
last are important because, once made aware of their interests, they
may significantly alter the agency's external political environment.
Regulatory agencies normally have a number of functionally distinct
constituencies, including 1) the people being regulated (the "clientele"), 2) the consumers of the products being regulated (who will
generally suffer from price increases under stringent regulation), 3)
the beneficiaries of the regulation (those living in polluted areas), 4)
the employees of the regulated firms, and 5) the taxpayers (who
generally bear the administrative costs of regulation). In practice, of
course, there may be considerable overlap among these groups; car
owners, for example, are the product consumers, the taxpayers, and
(if living in polluted areas) the beneficiaries of regulatory controls on
automotive emissions.
Constituency groups are important both for their attempts to
directly influence agency policy and for their ability when dissatisfied to appeal to the agency's sovereigns. They can, for example,
augment the agency's own technical resources. In fact, a large portion of industry's influence over regulatory agencies can be attributed to its expertise, particularly if the resources of the agency itself
are very limited. 6 The members of constituency groups can also
directly influence policy by attempting to convince the agency that
they have the support of a majority of the attentive public and/or
that a desired policy would be in the public interest. In a more subtle
fashion, constituency pressure for a more aggressive policy can be
used by agency officials as a bargaining tool in seeking changes in the
behavior of regulated groups.7
Dissatisfied constituency groups can indirectly influence agency
policy by appealing to the various sovereigns. This can involve ap75. For an extensive discussion of these distinctions-and the variables affecting the
movement from one stage to the next-see Sabatier, supra note 24, at Ch. 3; also Balbus,

The Concept of Interest in Pluralistand MarxianAnalysis, 1 POL. & SOC'Y 151 (1971).
76. There are, however, instances of environmental groups which have provided technical
assistance to regulatory agencies. For example, a Chicago air pollution group substantially
assisted the local agency in finding low-sulfur coal, a key step in the reduction of SO 2
emissions in the city; see Sabatier, supra note 7, at 322.
77. M. HOLDEN, supra note 48, at 26.
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peals on specific agency decisions, e.g., the tobacco industry's successful effort to have Congress overturn the FTC's prohibition of
cigarette advertising or court suits brought by environmental groups
against AEC siting decisions." s It can also take the more general
form of an appeal to the legislative and/or executive sovereigns to
change an agency's personnel and/or its legal authority. Examples
would include the oil industry's effort to prevent the reappointment
of Leland Olds to the FPC and the attempts of the auto companies
to delay, if not emasculate, the
stringent emission standards in the
79
1970 Clean Air Amendments.
It is no accident that most of the examples cited of successful
appeals by constituency groups have involved what might generically
be termed producers rather than consumers. For it has long been
observed that consumer and environmental groups generally lack
both continuity and expertise, in large part because few individuals
have sufficient ideological or material incentives to bear the enormous costs of organizing large numbers of people."0 By contrast,
individual producers have the resources and the incentives to attempt
to forestall government regulation and have, moreover, benefited
from extensive governmental efforts during wartime to organize
trade associations."' Recent years have, however, witnessed the
emergence of numerous environmental groups and "public interest"
law firms, and there is some evidence that a few agencies including
the FCC, are being effectively monitored. 8 2 But the effective long
term representation of consumer and environmental interests remains
problematic, as it probably requires organizations with virtually full
time staff, access to most areas of expertise relevant to the agency,
and fairly large memberships."
78. A. FRITSCHLER, supra note 6, at Ch. 7; EBBIN & R. KASPER, CITIZEN GROUPS
AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY (1974).
79. Hearings on the Suspension of the Auto Emission Standards. Before Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
80. P. HERRING, supra note 3, at 249; Fainsod, supra note 4, at 308; M. NADEL, supra
note 8, at Chs. 5-6; Downs, Up and Down with Ecology-The Issue-Attention Cycle, PUB.
INTEREST 38 (1972); M. OLSON, supra note 28; J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, Chs. 3, 16; Sabatier, supra note 7, at 302; and White, Rational Theories of Participation, 20 J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 255 (1976).
81. G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 66, 256
(1966); Steck, Advisory Committees in the Federal Government 19 (Paper presented at
1972 Ann. Meeting Am. Pol. Sci. A., Washington); R. ENGLER, supra note 52, at ch. 10.
82. E. KRASNOW & L. LONGLEY, supra note 6, at ch. 8; Sabatier, supra note 7, at
310; EBBIN & KASPER, CITIZEN GROUPS AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY (1974); Shor, supra note 43; Leone, supra note 44; and J. Berry, Citizens Approach
Government: The Strategies of Public Interest Groups (Paper presented at 1974 Ann. Meeting Midwest Pol. Sci. A., Chicago).
83. Sabatier, supra note 7, at 317.
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The balance of constituency group support is only one of several
factors which directly influence the policies of regulatory agencies.
Constituencies can, however, also influence virtually all of the other
factors including statutory resources, technical information, the
attitude(s) of the sovereign(s), and the attitudes of the agency
officials. For this reason, it has been argued that the presence of an
organized constituency supportive of aggressive regulation which is
capable of monitoring the agency and of mobilizing in its defense is a
necessary and, within certain broad limits, even a sufficient condition
for forestalling self-regulatory and perhaps even clientele oriented
balancing policies for any extended period of time.8 4
(6) Other agencies
While any agency has its own distinctive realm where it is authorized to make legally binding decisions, it also seeks to influence
other agencies through direct testimony and through appeals to that
agency's sovereigns. In its role as "partisan," it is thus similar to any
constituency group.' s In fact, an agency will normally coordinate its
efforts with its supporters in an effort to affect the policies of an-

other agency. This can continue, albeit in a more covert fashion, even
86

after their common sovereign has supposedly decided the issue.
This is the case not only with peer agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Corps of Engineers, but also with
agencies which are supposedly in a quasi-hierarchial relationship. For
example, it is not at all unusual for a local pollution control agency
displeased with EPA policy to seek assistance from local congressmen
87
in reversing that policy.
This brings us to the division of authority among agencies, where a
84. "Extended should be interpreted as 2-3 years; a constituency with the requisite
resources should be able to prevent self-regulatory policies for any longer period of time. In
general, the boundary conditions include the continuation of a reasonably healthy economy
(e.g. unemployment rates under 8%) and continued diffuse support for consumer (and/or
environmental) protection; the latter is indicated by public opinion surveys ranking these
issue(s) among the top 10 responses when asked to name the two or three most important
issues facing the country. Id. at 320.
85. The distinction between "partisan" and "authority" is taken from W. GAMSON,
POWER AND DISCONTENT 28 (1968). In much the same fashion, all partisans-whether
they be other agencies or constituency groups-are sometimes aggregated into what have
been termed "satellite groups." W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK
CITY 710 (1960).
86. See, e.g., 0. STRATTON & P. SIROTKIN, THE ECHO PARK CONTROVERSY
(1959); G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION, ch. 5 (1971); and A. MAASS, THE
KINGS RIVER PROJECT (1952).
87. This was frequently the case with local and state agencies in Indiana which were
upset with the numerous enforcement actions of EPA, Region V, after 1971. Sabatier, supra
note 7, at ch. 8.
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couple of points are worth making. First of all, it is often assumed
that agencies are constantly seeking to expand the domain in which
they are authorities rather than partisans. But there are certainly
counter examples, including the Public Health Service's adamant
resistance to Congressional efforts in the early 1960s to expand its
role in air pollution control.8 ' Instead, it makes much more sense to
treat agencies as rational actors who weigh the net benefits of any
change in authority in terms of its relationships with its sovereigns
and the net impact of the change on the agency's constituency
support. 8
It is also often assumed that overlapping authority among agencies
is undesirable because of the inefficient duplication of effort and the
possibility that conflicting regulations will engender uncertainty in
those being regulated. On the other hand, overlap has its advantages. 9 0 First, as agencies are often the major repositories of expertise, a sovereign aware of agency biases who wishes to make sure that
several sides of an issue are presented will look upon overlap with
favor, thereby pitting two agencies, for example the EPA and ERDA
on nuclear safety issues, in an adversary position with the sovereign
as the ultimate arbiter. Secondly, overlapping jurisdiction is almost
certainly conducive to stringent regulation: the more authorities
involved in an area, the greater the probability that one of them will
pursue an aggressive policy and that the regulated interests will be
forced to go along, albeit with vigorous complaints about the inequity of conflicting regulations. Finally, Roger Noll has argued that
efforts to consolidate the agencies involved in transportation management, the ICC for surface transport and the CAB for air transport,
will effectively abolish the last vestiges of competition in that industry, probably to the detriment of consumers. 9 ' In short, clear
demarcations of functional and geographic authority among agencies,
while perhaps desirable from some standpoints, are also probably not
conducive to aggressive regulation.
The discussion thus far has dealt with those factors which directly
affect the policies of regulatory agencies. There are, however, also
several situational (environmental) variables which, by influencing
attitudes and resources, indirectly affect agency policy.
88. Ripley, Congress and Clean Air, in CONGRESS AND URBAN PROBLEMS 239 (H.
Cleaveland ed. 1969).
89. Holden, Imperialism in Bureaucracy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 943 (1966); A.
DOWNS, supra note 20, at ch. 17.
90. Most of these ideas can also be found in Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the
Problem of Duplicationand Overlap, 29 PUB. AD. REV. 346 (1969).
91. R. NOLL, supra note 5, at 106.
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B. Situational Variables Indirectly Affecting Agency Policy
As here employed, "situational" refers to variables external to

governmental institutions and their constituencies which affect
attitudes toward public policy and/or the resources available to the
actors immediately concerned with agency policy. As Emmette
Redford has observed, "understanding of the governmental aspects

of regulation is possible only by analysis of the whole complex of
forces in which political structures operate." 9

2

These include (1)

socio-economic variables, (2) political culture, (3) the state of technological development, (4) public opinion, and (5)
nature of the problem calling for regulation.

the perceived

Although the importance of these factors would not normally be
disputed by any competent political scientist, these situational
variables have, with few exceptions, been dealt with only impressionistically, if at all, in most studies of regulatory agencies. 9 Such

treatment ignores the extent to which the effects of the resource and
attitudinal variables on regulatory policy may be explained largely, if

not entirely, by variation in situational factors.9" For example, it is
conceivable that inter-state differences in the strength of environmental constituencies and in support of sovereigns for aggressive air
pollution policy can largely be attributed to variations in socioeconomic conditions and actual pollution levels. It is for this reason
that these indirect influences on regulatory policy are explicitly
discussed in this paper, although in somewhat less detail than the

first-order variables.
92. Redford, supra note 4, at 1, 3.
93. In their study of the FCC, E. Krasnow & J. Longley, supra note 6, systematically
examine six "determiners" of agency policy: the FCC staff and commissioners, the broadcasting industry, citizens groups, the courts, the White House, and Congress. Although they
occasionally discuss one of our situational variables, e.g. changing technology, the treatment
is neither systematic nor a part of their analytical scheme. Similarly, the study by Fritschler,
supra note 6, of the FTC's attempts at the regulation of cigarette advertising focused on the
agency's relations with Congress, the tobacco companies and the Public Health Service.
Although the Surgeon General's Report on cigarettes was, of course, discussed, it was not
explicitly treated as a variable affecting perceptions of "the problem" and, therefore, actor
behavior. Even the study of state water pollution control agencies by L. Wenner, supra note
41, ignored situational variables, save for the nature of the problem (water quality). Finally,
the literature reviews by M. BERNSTEIN, supra notes 1 & 2, L. KOHLMEIER, supra note
66, and W. CARY, supra note 8, focused on legal-constitutional questions and the agencies'
relations with constituency groups and sovereigns.
94. See, e.g., the extensive literature on the importance of socio-economic variables in
determining interstate variation in expenditures and, to a lesser extent, policy outputs of
many agencies-most of them distributive rather than regulatory. T. DYE, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY, ch. 11 (1972); 1. SHARKANSKY, POLICY ANALYSIS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1970); and R. HOFFERHERT, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, chs.
4-6 (1974).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

(1) Socio-economic factors
Social and economic variables are important because they affect
the attitudes of private and governmental actors toward regulation,
as well as establishing limits on the resources available to private
actors and to the agency for tackling a perceived problem.
For example, attitudes toward air pollution control and environmental protection in general have been independently correlated
with income, education, age, and urbanization. 9 I In addition, there
is historical and survey evidence that unemployment rates and the
level of industrialization have affected general attitudes toward regulation of industry. 9 6 It seems highly probable, for example, that high
unemployment rates during the Depression and the desire for industrial development during and after World War II were instrumental in the apparently pervasive attitude that a belching smokestack
meant jobs and material prosperity.
Demands for industry to bear nonproductive costs in order to
benefit consumers are somewhat contingent upon the economic
health of the industry in question. A healthy industry is perceived as
being capable of bearing nonproductive costs; in depressed industries
or those subject to "boom and bust" cycles, on the other hand, there
are strong pressures for loans, subsidies, and a general effort by the
government to maintain and promote the welfare of the industry and
thereby resulting in what we have termed "selfits employees,
9
regulation." 7
In addition to the economic health of the actors subject to regulation, more general economic conditions obviously affect regulatory
policy. High interest rates, for example, are an impediment to stringent pollution control regulation because of their effects on the
capital markets; in part because of this, several states have created
revolving loan funds at low interest rates for such expenditures. On
the other hand, high interest rates and inflation in general facilitate
more stringent regulation of land development by depressing construction demand. Finally, there is fairly substantial empirical evidence that mean personal income is strongly correlated with total
95. McEvoy, The American Public's Concern with the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 135 (C. Goldman et al.ed. 1974);
Springer & Costantini, Public Opinion and the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 195 (S. Nagel ed. 1974); and J. Viladas, The American People and Their Environment-1973 (Unpublished report, EPA, 1973).
96. M. NADEL, supra note 6, at chs. 1-2; W. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN, ch. 3 (1973); Rankin, Air Pollution Control and Public
Apathy, 19 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL A. 565 (1968); and Erskine, The Polls: Pollution andIndustry, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 277 (1972).
97. Fainsod, supra note 4, at 303; J. DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS 49 (1974).
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government expenditures in a given jurisdiction; its association with

the distribution of those expenditures among various agencies and
between state and local government is, however, much weaker.9 8
(2) Political culture
Political culture refers to relatively stable attitudes toward the
range of legitimate issues, the proper role of government, the range
of political participants, and the legitimate means of expressing political demands. 9 I These general attitudes are grounded in long term
socio-economic conditions and migration patterns, as well as important historical events, such as the Civil War.' 0 Political culture
is, however, a rather amorphous concept, encompassing a number
of different facets and/or conceptual typologies, at least two of
which are relevant to regulatory policy-making.
Daniel Elazar has developed a typology of cultures based primarily
upon whether the political order is viewed as an association of selfinterested individuals or whether it is perceived as a commonwealth
in which all have certain common interests.' 0I An "individualistic"
political culture views the society as a marketplace; it places a
premium upon limiting community intervention into private activities and holds politics to be just another means by which individuals
may improve themselves socially and economically. By contrast, in a
"moralistic" culture politics is devoted to the advancement of the
public good; government is perceived as a positive instrument with
which to promote the general welfare, and the notion of public
office as a realm for private enrichment is rejected. Finally, "traditionalistic" political cultures are rooted in an ambivalent attitude
toward the marketplace, coupled with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the commonwealth; they are conservative and found only
in societies which retain some of the organic characteristics of the
preindustrial social order.
98. T. DYE, supra note 94, at ch. 11; I. SHARKANSKY, supra note 94, at chs. 4, 6, 10.
99. D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE, ch. 12 (1965); G.
ALMOND & S. VERBA, CIVIC CULTURE (1963).
100. 1. SHARKANSKY, supra note 94, at ch. 10; D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES, ch. 4 (1966); and D. ELAZAR, CITIES OF THE
PRAIRIE (1970).
101. Elazar's typology in AMERICAN FEDERALISM 85 (1966) bears many resem5lances to the distinction made by Banfield and Wilson between "public-regarding" and
'private-regarding" political cultures. While serious doubts have been raised about their
,fforts to associate political cultures with immigration patterns and with demographic varables, the potential utility of the concepts themselves in explaining policy variations
'emains. Wilson & Banfield, PublicRegardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior, 58
kM. POL. SCI. REV. 876 (1964); Wilson & Banfield, Political Ethos Revisited, 65 AM.
IOL. SCI. REV. 1048 (1972); Miller & Bennett, Communications, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
[265 (1974).
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Elazar's typology is relevant to our inquiry primarily because of its
implications for the role orientations of both regulatory officials and
their elected sovereigns. Because an individualistic culture conceives
of government as an arbiter among legitimate private interests rather
than as an aggressive proponent of the collective good, officials are
likely to view themselves as passive delegates.1 02 Such a culture
places a premium upon the resources available to organized interest
groups. But, as we have seen, the consumer and environmental proponents of aggressive regulatory policies are generally diffuse and
poorly organized. Because an individualistic political culture does not
encourage its officials to fill the vacuum by actively representing
diffuse, collective interests, it is thus less likely to promote aggressive
policies than its moralistic counterparts.1 0 ' While the propositions
thus far are essentially unverified hypotheses, there is some survey
evidence that, within any jurisdiction, citizens with a "collectivist"
orientation are more likely than "individualists" to support pollution
control activities.' 04
The second, and more direct, effect of political culture on regulatory policy concerns the prevailing attitude toward governmental
regulation of business and of private economic behavior in general.
For at least the past 30 to 40 years laissez-faire attitudes have in turn
been associated with political conservatives and, to a lesser extent,
with Republicans.' 0 Thus one would expect more aggressive regulatory policies to be pursued when liberals and, outside the South,
Democrats are strong. This is a proposition for which there exists a
fair amount of empirical support, both in attitudinal surveys and in
legislative roll calls.' 06
These variations in attitudes toward the governmental regulation
102. T. LOWI, supra note 29, at chs. 2-3; E. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE 270
(1961); R. WOLIFF-, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 148 (1968).
103. R. WOLFF, supra note 102, at 158; M. CRENSON, THE UN-POLITICS OF AIR
POLLUTION 83, 133 (1971).
104. Merrill & Springer, Economic Growth and Environmental Preservation (Paper presented at 1975 Ann. Meeting W. Pol. Sci. A., Seattle, 1975). Portions of Elazar's theory have
been tested, but, unfortunately, not the implications relevant to regulatory policy-making.
Johnson, Political Culture in the American States: Elazar'sFormulation Examined, 20 AM.
J. POL. SC. 491 (1976).
105. R. ERIKSON & N. LUTTBEG, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, ch. 3 (1973).
106. With respect to legislative roll-calls, Nadel has shown that a pro-consumer orientation in the 89th and 90th Congresses (1965-68) was particularly strong among Northern
Democrats and liberals. M. NADEL, supra note 8, at 101. A similar trend was found in the
1971 Congress on environmental issues, with gammas of .26 on partisanship and .88 on
liberalism. Ritt & Ostheimer, Congressional Voting and Ecological Issues, 29 W. POL. Q.
384 (1976). The correlation between environmental concern and liberalism was weaker among
the general public in 1972, but present nevertheless. Springer & Costantini, supra note 95, at
210.
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of business notwithstanding, the political culture of any capitalist
system places limits on such intervention. Since any such system puts
many of the basic economic decisions in the hands of private parties,
particularly large corporations and banks, businessmen in a system
with a strong laissez-faire tradition must maintain a satisfactory level
of autonomy if the system is to function efficiently. As John Maynard Keynes wrote with respect to the 1937 impasse between President Roosevelt and the business community:' 07
1 think the President is playing with fire if he does not now do
something to encourage the business world, or at any rate refrain
from frightening them further. If one is purporting to run a capitalist
system, and not something quite different, there are concessions that
have to be made. The worst of all conceivable systems is a capitalist
one kept on purpose by authority in a state of panic and lack of
confidence.
While the amount of governmental regulation has certainly increased
over time, the need to maintain the confidence of the business community strongly influences the pace at which it can proceed.' 0 8
(3) Technology
Earlier in this paper the technical expertise available to an agency
was cited as one of the principal factors directly affecting agency
policy, particularly with respect to the stringency and enforcement
of regulations. But that expertise will in turn partially be a function
of the technological state of the art.
An agency cannot require the installation of safety devices or
emission control equipment which do not exist. But an aggressive
agency or a stringent statute can promulgate regulations which require the development of new technologies over a given period of
time. The 1970 Clean Air Amendments, for example, stipulated a 90
percent reduction in auto emissions by 1975 on the basis of predictions by the auto companies that, while the technology to achieve
such reductions did not then exist, it could be developed by
1980.1 o9 Such a strategy is probably feasible when the agency has
the funds to conduct, and/or contract for, a substantial portion of
the research as well as the funds and authority to develop the prototypes, etc.
In the American capitalist system, however, industry normally
controls the state of technological development (a) because only
107. Quoted in J. LASH, ELEANOR AND FRANKLIN 468 (1971).
108. A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM, chs. 1, 6, 13 (1969).
109. The Impact of Auto Emission Standards: A Staff Report, Sen. Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973); Bonine, supra note 16, at 11.
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industry has the funds to develop expensive new non-productive
technologies such as auto emission controls and stack gas desulfurization and (b) because of the quite strict political and legal norms
against the operation of an industrial enterprise, the ultimate control
over the development of new technologies, by a public agency.1 0
The control of technological development by the regulated industries can produce considerable frustration, as is indicated by an
-October 1973 staff report of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution:' ' 1
In the early years the [auto] industry effectively suppressed the
development of emission control systems, largely by concentrating
all its development efforts on "improving" the standard internal
combustion engine. Subsequent to enactment of Federal regulatory
authority in 1965, little was done to press the development of alternative technologies. Even after the enactment of the 1970 Act, the
industry's response was far less than adequate.
The report goes on to cite several instances of industry resistance
after the 1970 Amendments and to bemoan the undesirable sideeffects, especially decreased performance and fuel economy, of the
technology chosen by an oligopolistic industry. Federal air pollution
officials have encountered similar problems over the past ten or
twelve years in trying to convince the coal companies and electrical
utilities to develop feasible stack gas desulfurization technologies.1 12
Despite EPA insistence that the two technologies do exist, vigorous
industrial demurrers and the absence of any sanctions short of the
nuclear deterrents of, in effect, closing down major corporations
have induced Congress to postpone the deadline for the achievement
of the relevant air quality and emission standards by two to four
years.' ' In short, industrial control of the pace of technological
110. See, e.g., A. SHONFIELD, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 298 (1968); M. HOLDEN,
supra note 48, at 18, 31; and Fainsod, supra note 4, at 300. For a discussion of the oil
industry's successful efforts to prevent government production of synthetic fuels and rubber
prior to WW Il-despite having borne sizable research costs-see ENGLER, THE POLITICS
OF OIL 96 (1960).
To give some idea of the capacity of a regulatory agency to develop an expensive new
technology, EPA's total research and development budget for air pollution in FY 1973 was
$70,712,000, of which roughly $19,000,000 and $15,000,000 were authorized for the
development of control technology for sulfur oxides and mobile sources, respectively. By
contrast, the three auto companies spent approximately $725,000,000 in 1973 on emission
controls, or a sum equivalent to about 22 percent of 1972 profits. Senate Subcomm., supra
note 109, at viii.
111. Id., at vi.
112. Engdahl, supra note 50, at 364; Senate Interior Committee, supra note 50, at 180.
113. The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination. Act of 1974 (a) authorized
the suspension until January 1979 of sulfur emission standards for power plants in areas
where the primary air quality standards are not exceeded and (b) delayed the date for a 90
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development can place substantial limitations on the stringency and/
or enforceability of regulations.
The pace of technological change can also create sufficient instability in an industry that demands arise for extensive formal supervision by governmental agencies. This situation often results in a
basically self-regulatory policy. Emmette Redford argues, for example, that a "burgeoning technology" in air transportation was one
of the principal factors in the creation of the CAB, and the Federal
Radio Commission was created in the 1920s to manage the allocation
of an essential resource in a new industry.' 14
(4) Public opinion and the mass media
In contrast to the rather stable character of the attitudes delimited
by "political culture," public opinion as here employed refers to the
generally transient attitudes of the population on the major items
which are, or should be, on the governmental agenda(s). Public opinion polls reveal that the priority issues of the general public are
subject to constant change, with an issue generally commanding
extensive public attention for only a couple of years.' 1'
While a sharp increase in public concern with a particular issue can
directly affect agency policy, it is probable that the major effects are
basically indirect, being funneled through the constituencies, the
sovereigns, and changes in the agency's legal authority. In fact, the
basic influence of such an upsurge in public opinion, the crest of a
social movement, will be a function of its capacity to induce changes
in the agency's budget and legal authority and to leave an "organizational residue" (i.e. an organized interest group) to monitor those
changes over an extended period of time.' 1 6
Public concern calling for regulation of new activities and/or
changes in present regulatory policies is dependent upon some variables which have already been discussed, notably socio-economic
conditions and various aspects of political culture. It is also a function of perception of harmful conditions which can be related to the
behavior of economic producers, a topic to which we shall shortly
percent reduction in auto emissions from 1975 to 1977 (carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons) and 1978 (nitrogen oxides). Conference Report on H.R. 14368, U.S. House, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974).
114. Redford, supra note 4, at 6; E. KRASNOW & J. LONGLEY, supra note 6, at 9.
115. We are here referring to the rather transient priority lists which emerge from openended questions of the nature, "What do you feel are the two or three most important
issues/problems in the country?" It does not refer to the rather stable responses to structured questions on specific issues/problems, e.g., integration. See, e.g., R. ERIKSON & N.
LUTTBEG, supra note 105, at 57.
116. Downs, supra note 80, at 41; Fainsod, supra note 4, at 308; and Sabatier, supra
note 7, at 325.
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turn. Before doing so, however, it would be well to briefly discuss an
important intervening variable, namely, the media of mass communications.
While fairly obvious, it is still worth noting that the mass media
play an important role in moulding public opinion, particularly in
determining issue priorities and in setting the political agenda. Because most people are heavily dependent upon the media for information on current political affairs and because each editor must select
those items which he deems newsworthy, there is insight in a journalist's exaggerated contention that "news is what we make it."' '7
Several studies have, for example, indicated a fairly strong correlaof environmental topics and public
tion between media coverage
8
concern with those issues.' 1
Fortunately for the proponents of aggressive regulation, there is
some evidence that the media in general, or at least newspapers,
often view themselves as having a special responsibility for the protection of large, diffuse interests like consumer and environmental
protection. 1 9 In fact, Nadel has argued that the media play a more
important role in consumer protection than organized consumer
groups.1 2 0 But this argument, while plausible, emerged from a study
which focused on Congressional behavior and on the regulatory
agency, the FDA, which is probably most adequately monitored by
the media and specifically, by Morton Mintz of The Washington Post.
In general, however, the media seldom (a) show a continuing concern
with a specific issue over an extended period of time, (b) demonstrate a capacity for acquiring and transmitting the type of dull and
technical information which is often at the core of regulatory policymaking, and (c) possess the mechanisms to elicit a response, for
example, protest letters from the general public to the agency on a
specific matter before the agency. 21 In short, while the media
undoubtedly play an important role in the generation of reform
movements, they tend to share the movements' defects of episodic
and "amateurish" concern-rather than the continuous, expert mon117. K. STEWART, NEWS IS WHAT WE MAKE IT (1943); L. DEXTER & D. WHITE,
PEOPLE, SOCIETY, AND COMMUNICATIONS, Part III (1964).
118. For example, a study of 50 cities revealed a strong correlation (p = .53, significant
at the .05 level) between environmental concern and coverage by the local press. J. Sacco,
Community Leadership and Air Quality Improvement (unpublished paper, U.S.C., 1972).
See also Murch, Public Concern for Environmental Pollution 35 PUB. OPINION Q. 100
(1971).
119. E. BANFIELD & J.WILSON, CITY POLITICS 317 (1963).
120. M. NADEL, supra note 6, at 212. See also Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political
Entrepreneurs, in PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION-MAKING (G. Tullock ed. 1966).
121. Downs, supra note 80, at 40; Sabatier, supra note 7, at 326. There are, however,
some exceptions, e.g. Casey Buckro of the Chicago Tribune.
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itoring which is essential for the maintenance of a reasonably aggressive policy.
(5) Actual conditions and perceived problems
For purposes of analysis, a distinction can be made between objective conditions and the perceived problems-with information being
the crucial intervening variable. The objective nature of the problem
refers to a situation inimical to the welfare of some people attributable to someone's behavior. For example, it is logically possible and
analytically useful to say that noxious ambient air levels, misleading
advertising, and unsafe products are problems irrespective of
anyone's perception of those situations at the time.
Important attributes of the problem include the priority accorded
the affected value, the number and political resources of those adversely affected, and the nature of the sources. For example, ambient
air levels which adversely affect public health are deemed more serious than simply dirty air. A situation which affects 5000 people in a
community is different from one which affects fifty. Polluted air
which adversely affects the wealthy and the well-educated is more
likely to result in demands for regulatory controls than that which
harms only the poor.' 22 And a problem which can be traced to a
few large corporations is quite different from one for which many
small and economically-marginal sources are responsible.
But, from the standpoint of public policy, it is the perceived
rather than the objective nature of the problem which is important.
And perceptions depend upon the information available.1 2 3
Insofar as the problem is amenable to direct sensory experience
and its implications are fairly straightforward, awareness of the problem is rather unproblematical. An example would be visible particulate emissions from a steel mill. On the other hand, insofar as the
problem is remote from the senses and/or requires considerable sophistication in determining the implications and sources, institutions
specifically responsible for the generation and dissemination of information become more important. Sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) poses more
obstacles than particulate matter because it is invisible and because
an assessment of its impact on public health requires considerable
medical research. Similarly, photochemical smog in Los Angeles
remained an intractable problem for a number of years because it
was not until the mid-1950s that researchers identified the basic
source as the automobile rather than petroleum refineries, utilities,
122. S. VARBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA, ch. 8 (1972); R. LANE,
POLITICAL LIFE 224 (1959); Sabatier, supra note 7, at chs. 5-8.
123. J. DAVIES, SETTING THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ch. 2 (1976).
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and apartment houses as had been long believed.' 24 In short, the
costs of obtaining information about some problems are much
greater than for others.
In addition, the presence of actors willing and able to bear these
costs strongly affects the generation and dissemination of information. Anthony Downs has argued quite persuasively that information
costs are unlikely to be borne by those adversely affected insofar as
they are numerous and have only a relatively nonsalient interest at
stake." 2 5 This is precisely the case on most environmental and consumer issues. In such situations, the responsibility for generating and
disseminating the requisite information falls heavily on (a) universities and other research institutes, (b) governmental agencies, and (c)
the mass media. For example, a comparative study of Chicago and
Indianapolis air pollution policy revealed far greater public concern
in the former, only partially because of the more degraded ambient
air levels; other factors included the presence of university researchers who had conducted epidemiological studies in the local
area, the greater capacity and willingness of the Chicago agency to
monitor and disseminate information on air quality levels, and the
greater willingness of the Chicago media to demand that such information be provided. 1 26
The perceived nature of the problem and of alternative regulatory
policies thus constitutes one of the factors obviously affecting the
policy preferences of the general public, the agency's sovereigns, and
various satellite groups. It is likely, therefore, to have a substantial,
albeit indirect, affect on policy outputs.
III. THE DETERMINANTS OF AGENCY POLICY: A SUMMARY
This paper has identified six sets of resource and/or attitudinal
variables which directly affect the policy pursued by a regulatory
agency, as well as five other situational variables which, because of
their effects on the former set, indirectly affect agency policy. The
flow diagram in Figure 1 should bring some coherence to this variable list by indicating some of the important relationships among
variables.
While the diagram should be relatively self-explanatory, there are a
few clarifying points which need to be made. First, the temporal
sequence is from left to right, with political culture and most socioeconomic variables conceived as relatively stable in the short term
124. G. HAGEVIK, DECISION-MAKING IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 81 (1970).
125. A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238 (1957).
126. Sabatier, supra note 7, at chs. 5-8.
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(1-2 yrs.) and agency policy decisions as the dependent variable. The
arrows depict the dominant short term direction of a relationship,
with two way flows avoided as essentially unenlightening; the major
exceptions are reciprocal relationships between an agency and its
constituencies and the relationship between technology and the regulated industry (as the "state of the art" certainly affects the behavior
of regulated groups, while the regulated have a substantial impact on
the rate of technological development). Secondly, "agency policy"
refers to the general policy guidelines, the regulations, and the adjudicatory decisions of the agency. It is to be distinguished from the
impacts of those decisions on actors external to the agency depicted
by a feedback loop indicated by a dashed line. Thirdly, the flow
chart achieves greater comprehensiveness as one approaches the
dependent variable; one could, for example, add an idiosyncratic
preference component to virtually all of the variables, but that would
unnecessarily clutter the diagram.
The flow diagram is not intended to serve as an operational model
suitable for quantitative, multi-variable analysis. For one thing, many
of the variables, including capitalism and Elazar's typology as components of "political culture," are really variable sets. In addition, it
is rather doubtful that quantitative indicators can be found for several of the variables, although ordinal scales comparable to that suggested for legal resources in Table 3 could conceivably be developed
for other variables, such as technical resources. Thirdly, there are just
too many variables to permit statistical manipulation unless one dealt
with a large number of cases in the dependent variable, in which case
measurement error would almost certainly increase. Finally, there are
so many gaps in our knowledge of the interrelationship among variables that such a model does not at present seem very practical.
Instead, the flow diagram basically represents a qualitative framework designed to integrate the existing literature (a) by presenting a
reasonably comprehensive variable list and (b) by postulating some
of the basic relationships. Although representing an interim strategy,
it should facilitate cumulative research in several ways.
First, the variable list itself should assure that important variables
directly affecting agency -policy, notably legal resources, are no
longer slighted by behaviorally oriented political scientists. Conversely, it suggests that probably far too much attention has been
paid to agency structure; witness the long standing debate concerning
the merits of independent commissions versus line agencies, as well as
President Carter's concern with reorganization. This is only one of
five important aspects of legal resources, which in turn is only one of
six variables directly affecting agency policy.
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Secondly, the discussion of the situational variables indirectly
affecting agency policy should make researchers more conscious of
the need to address the question of whether the alleged impacts of
one or more first-order variables on agency policy may be largely
explained by variation in situational variables. Suppose, for example,
that investigation showed that the policies of most environmental
and consumer protection agencies moved from clientele-oriented
balancing to somewhat more aggressive policies [supra, Table I]
during the 1960s and early 1970s. One would first attribute this to
changes in their legal and technical resources, personnel changeover,
and the emergence of viable consumer and environmental constituencies during this period. But to what extent are these, in turn, caused
by long term changes in technology and various socio-economic
conditions? A sophisticated multi-variate analysis would, I suspect,
indicate that at least half of the variance in agency policy attributed
initially to the first-order variables would turn out to be the result of
changes in the situational variables.
Thirdly, the flow diagram should assist researchers in identifying
the boundary conditions under which propositions hold.1 2 7 For
example, any study of the effects of constituency groups on agency
policy should posit a range of values for the other variables directly
influencing policy and for the situational variables affecting constituency groups such as public opinion and perhaps socio-economic
conditions, under which the proposition is asserted to hold.1 2 8
Similarly, comparative case studies should be designed so as to hold
constant as many other variables as possible; these would then constitute the boundary conditions limiting the generalizability of the
conclusions.
Finally, the diagram should be helpful to those wishing to develop
quantitative path models of agency decisions for those aspects of the

127. A scientific generalization is of the form, "Given a, b, and c, if x, y, then z." A, b,
and c constitute the boundary conditions within which the relationship of x, y, and z is
asserted to hold.
128. For example, I have argued elsewhere that, because constituency groups can influence all of the other variables directly affecting agency policy, an environmental or
consumer constituency with full-time staff, expertise in most of the relevant policy areas,
and a fairly large membership (i.e. 0.1% of the voting population in the relevant jurisdiction)
can-under certain conditions- prevent an agency from adopting a self-regulatory policy for
any extended period of time (i.e. over 2 years). Those boundary conditions include the
following: 1) the continuation of a reasonably healthy economy, i.e. unemployment rates
under 8%; 2) the absence of a major national crisis, e.g. a major war or depression; and 3)
the continuation of diffuse public support for consumer and/or environmental protection
(as indicated by public opinion surveys ranking such issues among the top 10). Sabatier,
supra note 7, at 320.
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system where quantification is feasible. 1 29 Provided that the boundary conditions are carefully specified, such models should permit
more precise estimates of the relative impacts of a series of independent variables. These models may also permit the elimination of
some paths altogether, such as the direct effect of political culture on
public opinion unmediated by the media, or the addition of more
paths, including the direct one from the media to agency policy.
The conclusions thus far have all concerned the utility of looking
at agency policy from a systems framework. On a more substantive
level, I would hypothesize that, if both the legal and technical resources of the agency (including explicit policy directives, broad
substantive authority, and the authority to levy a wide range of
penalties) are high and if both a viable reform constituency and
agency officials support a fairly aggressive policy, then the pursuit of
such a policy for a year or two is relatively unproblematic. Conversely, if legal and technical resources provide only ambiguous directives, the agency will be in a rather precarious position and thus
sensitive at all times to the preferences of its sovereigns and constituency groups. Over a 5 to 10 year time span, the balance of constituency groups, and ultimately changes in socio-economic and
technological conditions, become crucial. These conclusions are,
however, extremely tentative, as the sophisticated multi-variate analysis necessary to get beyond our rudimentary understanding of the
variables affecting regulatory policy-making remains to be done.

129. For discussions of path analysis, see Duncan, Path Analysis, 72 AM. J. SOC. 1
(1966); Stokes, CompoundPaths, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 191 (1974).

